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The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Bank
Supervisors
Kim Norris.

I

Introduction
th the tumulruous global events

of

the past two years still fresh in our minds,

the often repeated questions ate, what went wrong and whose fault was it?
These are weighty questions indeed and thete is obviously more than enough

blame to go around! More importandy though, and defioite\ more challenging, is the

of

question as to how we can mitigate against any future occuttence. A significant number

ideas have been proffered as possible solutions and the discussion and debate continues.

Many of these require considerable analysis, and honest discussion with

a

touch of humility

with respect to our true capabilities. As we can all appreciate, most of these ideas sound
good in theory. The challenge,

of

of

course, is always in the implementation. The realities

Nigeria, exacerbated by the recent dramatic events in the financial sector, cetaidy do not
lessen this

challenge. It

is imperative

thatwe at the Cenral Bank of Nigeda (CBITI) learn the

Iessons well, as they have particular relevance and applicability

forus.

of cross-border issues for the CBN, I wiil like to expand the
discussion further to touch ofl some of the broader lessons that we are learning as a
consequence of the global financial crisis, provide some h.igh level d.iscussion about some of
Recognizing the importance

the many international initiatives from standard setters and others and conclude with a
discussion on risk-based supervision aod whether, after the Snancial crisis,

it is still

an

appropriate supervision model for the CBN.

II.

Debates on the Global Financial Crises

The global financial crisis has triggered significant reforms and a number
debates that

will have long lasting implications for banks and the

of impotant

uray they are supetvised.

There is general agteement that supervision must be made more robust, proactive and
' Mr. Kirn Norris is the Special Adviser to the Governor on Banking Supervision, the Ccnuel Bank of Nigcria. The views
expressed in this paper arc those of the author and do not necessarily teptesent the views of th€ CBN or its policies.
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of prudential supervision,
focusing less on single entities and more on how the components of the financial system
interact. We ate learning about the need to deal with the concept of pro-cyclicality in
relation to regulatoty capital. There are many advocates of closer linkages to
macroeconomic indicatots including tying a portion of capital requirements to
being told that we need to btoaden the focus

macroeconomic indicators such as asset and credit growth and asset prices in the economy.
Such,

if

adopted, would have important consequeflces for Nigeria given the explosive

growth of the sector since consolidation. There is unanimous agteement that for there to
be any meaningfirl reform, we must have an appropriate internationally-accepted regulatory

framework.

There is also wide agreement that

a

priority area fot regulatory reform is the need to develop

policies to re-assert market discipline
expectations

-

the need to end the continuation

of implicit of explicit support of

Debate also continues as to the merits

of

of deep-rooted

financial institutions by governments.

declaring some institutions as systemic, with the

argument against, being that such c ategoizaaon may actually reduce market discipline and
increase the risk

of

moral hazard. V/hatever regulatory changes we put in place, it is

important to remember that the rules ot regulations can create incentives to do one action,
and not another. Therefore, we must be vigilant to push for incentives that lead to outcomes
we want, and not incentives that lead to unintended consequences

-

consequences which we

wil.[ all subsequendy have to deal with, and which could have an unforeseen, yet dramatic

impact.

III. InternationdPerspectives
A significant number of international

initiatives are underway,

with

nume rous

to mitigate any reoccurreflce of crisis. Principal
these initiatives has been the work of the G20 which has been a &iving force in

recommendations and suggestions
amongst

formulating and coordinating a global response to the finqrcial crisis. The frst G20 summit
was held in l$(/ashinSon DC in Novembet 2008, followed by two summits so far, in 2009 -

I-ondon (April) and Pittsburgh (September). These suhmits are t)?ically preceded by
meetings

of G20 Finance Ministers

and Central Bank Govetnots, which group met most

recendy on November 7, 2009. The G20 established the Financial Stabi.lity Board @SB) to
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coordinate and monitor progress in strengthening nati()nal and international financial
regulation.

Flowing from the G20 Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 were 107 commitments.
that total, 24 fell under the rublc Strengtheritg

tbe Intemational

Fixarcial Regulatory .l1nen. For

most part, these commitments reflect the cross-border theme
terminology such

of reform",

as

Of

of your conference with

"global stafldards", "internally agreed rules", "international framework

etc. interspersed

throughout. The G20

issued a challenge to all supervisory

authorities to improve their supervisory standards and called fot specific reforms to improve

of bank capital, compensation pmctices, the over-thecounter derivatives market and cross-bordet resolutions and systemically imPortant
financial institutions. The FSB subsequendy held a plenary meeting to tackle these issues in
such areas as the quantity and quality

more detail.

In April 2009, the FSB issued its Pinciphs for Cross-border Cooperation
Tbese Pinciples, wbich are paniruhr! releuant to tbe CBN, reqaire regxlators to:

.
.
o

on Cisis Managemenl.

meetat regular intervals to discuss issues related to cross-border operations;
set up supervisory colleges

for systemically important cross-border banks;

share relevant information on group structures and legal, fiaancial and
opetational intra-group dependencies;

o
o

identi& linkages with the financial system and various financial markets;
develop common support tools such as key data lists/common language for
assessing systemic implications to manage cross-botder financial impacts; and

o

consider practical barriets to achieving coordinated action in the event of acrisis
event and consider how such barriers could be overcome or removed.

The G-20 has also agreed that financial authorities should be able to identify and take
account

of macto-prudential risks. A macro-ptudential approach

takes a system-wide view

of how govetnment regulation, policies and other intetventions in the financial sector affect
business cycles and the broader economy. In Nigeria for example, a "P" government policy

decision has been made to grow and develop the financial sector which has serious
implications fot ensuring safety and soundness. Much of the growth has taken place cross-
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border. Was the CBN well positioned to monitor the safety and soundness of such crossborder activities? In all

of

this, it is important to note that this system-wide view is

supplement to sound micro-prudential regulation and not

a

a

replacement.

Concuttent with the FSB's plenary meeting was the release of The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision's Rtport and Rccommendations of the Cross-bordtr Batk Rrsohtior Grorp.
The Report recommended:

c
.

slrenglbeningnational resohrtion powers and their cross-bordtr inplementatiott:
errco ragtrlS ex-anle action

ard iutit,tion spedfc coltitgenry planning ahicb

inuoh,es

themseluu ard critical bomef bost stpmtisors; and

o

redlcingcontagton and linitingtbe i@act 0r1tbe

Slne exPerti are noa

r

arket 0f tbefiture.

a/sa qrustionirg wbetber artain

mmplexfor theirmanagement t0

itri-

fnancial inslittttions hale grown too big and too
lYe know that it is defnite! nare thalbngingto utpenise afnarcial

irlrtit,ttiln ar itgrotyr. Cross-bordcrgrowtb introdtns afitrlber dinension of conplexij. As
rerert!, it

is perbaps n0

longer "too bU toJail", bat rather, "too big to

we haae seen

nn". It bas bun stgested

thatfar

fron expert! nariplatiry theirfnt's books, manl CEOr co d not mderstand tbem. Tbe Cbair oJ tbe
UK's FSA has calledfor rynenical! inponan barks to draw lp "lit,irgailb" as a forciry dcria for tbe

cltif cation and si@lifcation of bgal stntcttru. Tltere is a qustion as to n hether a

boities hate

been too

tolerant of tbe proffiration af conplex legal shurtnes wbicb ofer extend bryond national borders, designed
to

maximiTg regalatory and tax arbihage.

Ia

October 2009, the S enior S uperx,isors

Grory $SG)issuedNsk Managenent l-,essorsfron

BankingCrisis of 2008 whib identifed defciencies in
axd ixtenal control programs tbal
management issuu, the SSG

o

the failure

of

and adhere to

.
.

contrib

frru

malagemefi,

isk

to, or were reaealed @, the crisis. In addition to

management

liqtiditl

irk

highlighted:

some boards
a

ed

the gouernance,

the Global

level

of directors

and senior managers to establish, measwe,

of risk acceptable to the firm;

compensation programs that conflictedwith the conrol objectives of the

fitm;

inadequate and often fragmented technological infrastructures tl-rat hindered
effective risk identification and measurement; and

o

institutional arrangements that conferred status and iflfluence on risk takers at the

l6l
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expense of independent risk managers and control petsonnel.

Early in 2009, Pdme Minister Gordon Brown asked David l7alker to review corporate
governance in UKbanks. The terms of

ference were:
"To examine corporate gourttarce in the UK bankingirdas@ atd makt recommendations, inclading in tbe
following areas: the effectiunus oJ isk na agerrlert at blard leul, iuhdingthe innnlittes in remrneralion
poliry to nanage isk efectiuej; the balance of skillt expeience and independence reqaired on tbe boards of
re

UK barking institttiors; the efectiunus of board practias and the pufornarce of adit, isk,
remmeration and nomiration commiltut; the roh of institltional sbareholders it erlgaging efedil,eb ,vitb
companies and monitoingoJ boards; and uhetber tbe UK approacb is consistert witb in*rnatiotalpractice
and bow natiotal atd intenational bestpractice can beprom gated.

In S'ep*nber 2009,

A

En tities was releasedfor

Rtuieu
consa

of

Corporate Gor.'ernance

in UK Banks and

otber Financial

Indutry

/tation witb 3 9 recommendations coueing

o
o
o
o
.

boatd size, composition, qualifications;

.

femuneraflofl

functioningof the board& evaluation of petformance;
role

of institutional shareholders;

communication & engagement;
governance of risk; and

ry. I-essons fotBank Supervisots
It is interesting to note that the Walker Commission also que stioned whether
shareholders would be better setved by "a less complex product

^ff

y

a.

bank

I;]lote manageable

business model and mote limited geogtaphic reach." Are there lessons for us here?

The financial crisis has also resulted in a significant degree of introspection by regulators,
central banks and "experts" around the wodd about the most appropriate model of

supervision. Many regulators are being criticized for poor performance and are under fire
for inaction. The question at hand is whether it was the risk-based supervisory model that
so many supervisors ate now using, orwas it the implementation

of the model that failed

us

in some cases?

A look at the evidence is instructive. Although
many

of

a sub-based

supetvisory approach is used by

the world's Frnancial sector supervisors, their results and performances have been
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uneven. In October 2009, the W'odd Economic Forum rated Catada

x

December 2009

having the most

"sound" banking system for the second yeat in succession. The United States of America
was rated #108 (out

of 133).

different supervisory approach.

sol

Both are sub-based supervisors, howeveq each uses
W'as

a

one more successful than another? It would appear

Supervisory approaches range from "light touch", which the UKs FSA has been

accused of, to intrusive which is tlpically what we think about the United States' model.

of these two approaches, with "intrusiveness"
escalating as coflcerns about an institution increase. Canada is also a conservative,
Canada would fall somewhere in the middle

principles based supervisor

as

compared to the more rules based apptoach to regulation

the United States, and focuses more on process and policy testing than

it

of

does on

ttansaction testing. To determine the optimum approach is a difficult challenge.

Nigeria has largely followed the United States' model of supervision,

a system

tlat

is

under

crisis. By October 24,2009,106 banks had
being deemed weak. Were it not for the Fedetal Deposit

intense scrutiny due to the curreflt financial
failed in the US with many more

Insurance Corporation's

€DIC'E mandate of promoting confidence in the

financial

system, the speculation is that many more banks would have been closed. Bank failures
have cost the

FDIC US$25 billion in 2009 and the FDIC wants banks to pay in advance

US$45 billion in premiums that would have been due over the next three

years. The

situation is extremely serious and necessary changes and improvements to the supervisoty
system in the United States are beingdebated.

As the United States is currendy doing, we are re-evaluating our eisting supervisory
structures and processes hete

in Banking Supervision Department (BSD) and Other

Financial Institutions Department

(OFID).

We need to answer the question - what can we

do better, both structually and procedurally?

The United Kingdom is also proposing changes and improvements to its supervisory
system. Lord Adair Turner, the Chairman of the UK's FSA has opined in his Mzrch2009,
Tbe Turner

'It

futiety:

is notinabb, boweuet that this distilction belween

srpenisotl sjbs

is

rot

thar!

conelated

aith

relatite ssccess. TbeUS gstenof ruosrn intensite bank examinalion has bem no more stccessfil
than the UK's @proach in preuenting bank faihre. Contersely both Canada and ,fpain, with
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dffirent stQemisory

approacbes, baue

so

far

Supervisors

been

bts affecred

dtterminants of Spair's ard Canada's relatite stccess
patirular cboiu of vperuisory @1e".

b

the

163

bankitgnisis.........

seem more lileel1 to lie

Tbe

in otberJaaors tban in a

The evidence is clear that sub-based supervision is only e!9 element to achieving a sound
regulatory system and ensuring financial stabiliry Others hclude adhetence to the Basle
Committee's 25

Core

Pinciphsfor Efectiue Bark Srperuisior and the so called "pre-conditions"

which include accounting rules, robust laws,
ke),

a

knowledgeable judiciary

priority focus for the CBN and much need to be done. The quality

etc. This must be a
of supervisory staff

and processes is extremely important, a reality that the CBN appreciates and is working

manfully to improve. The financial crisis has magrrified the need for supervisors to have an
in-depth understanding of interactions among banks and banks and other financial sectors,
not only domestically but internationally

as

well.

Equally impotant is the identification

of

regulatory gaps and as always, continued enhancements to corporate governance and
transparency are absolutely critical.

V.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the debate on solutions and best practices continues. There is agteement on
some issues, but less so on others. National considerations are sometimes in conflict

with

international considerations. What is clear, however, is that we have (should have) leamed
many lessons and that the gteat majority

of

these lessons have relevance fot us at the CBN.

As regards risk-based supervision, the genetal tenets are sound. The success factors are tied
to implementation. The CBN is dedicated to improving the way supervision is conducted

in

Nigeria and to protecting the safety and soundness of our financial sector. The risk-based
and consolidated Srpmtisory Frameworkfor Barks

ad

OtberFinancial

tool that the CBN will be using to achieve these goals in

In$itltion

in

assessing the dsk

Nigtia ts the

of individual

institutions and the financial system. In 2010, we will be working to implement some of the
"lessons" and focusing on implementation of the risk -bzsed, S tperuisory liamen ork.
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